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Abstract
Before one can reasonably assess Professor Miller’s argument in
”Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law,” a fundamental distinction
needs to be drawn. That distinction is between the Constitution and
constitutional law. For Professor Miller, there is no Constitution beyond
constitutional law; the Constitution is only what the judges say it
is - no more, no less.
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Before one can reasonably assess Professor Miller's argument in
"Nuclear Weapons and Constitutional Law," a fundamental distinction
needs to be drawn. That distinction is between the Constitution and
constitutional law. For Professor Miller, there is no Constitution beyond constitutional law; the Constitution is only what the judges say it
is - no more, no less. And what the judges say it is depends only upon
what Oliver Wendell Holmes in The Common Law called the "felt necessities of the times." 1 In Professor Miller's estimation the Constitution has no inherent political theory; its meaning depends only upon
time and circumstance - and the judge's intuition.
Professor Miller's argument concerning the constitutionality of nuclear weapons can only be made once the Constitution is separated
from constitutional law and discarded - or at least ignored. What
must guide our constitutional thinking, Professor Miller insists, are not
"old practices and old modes of thinking about constitutional propriety" but "new doctrine."' 2 That new doctrine, apparently, is to be "discovered" in the higher law that Professor Miller is sure hovers above
the Constitution itself. Professor Miller's quest is for the judicial formulation of a doctrine

-

the creation of a new right, actually -

that

postulates that "nuclear weapons are a clear and present danger both
to. survival and especially to achievement of human dignity." 3 Thus,
nuclear weapons, by the enormity of their potential destructiveness the annihilation of human existence - violates the essence of natural
justice. But to say that someting violates natural justice is not the same
thing as saying it violates the Constitution. As James Wilson saw fit to
remind his fellow-delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787, "laws
may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive;
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Dickinson College.
1. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
2.

Miller, Nuclear Weapons and the Constitution, 7 NOVA L. J. 21, 31 (1982).

3. Id. at 26.
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and yet not be . . . unconstitutional." 4 The same logic holds for nu-

clear weapons the procurement and accumulation of which is a matter
of public law.
Rather than examine each strand of Professor Miller's legal reasoning, I prefer to consider the theoretical premises from which his arguments spring. For his theoretical premise-the idea of a living Constitution - is ultimately at odds with the logic of the Constitution
itself.
The aim of those who framed the Constitution was to produce a
document that they hoped would "last for ages." 5 Their belief was that
safe republican government depended upon a constitution that would
be venerated by the people as "fundamental" and "paramount". 6 To
achieve such popular veneration - and to enjoy the necessary political
stability that would flow therefrom - the framers recognized, first,
that the constitution would have to be a written constitution and, second, that there would have to be a popular presumption of textual permanence of the document itself. That is, as James Madison understood
it, its meaning was not to be "sought in the changeable meaning of the
words composing it" but rather in "the sense in which the Constitution
was accepted and ratified by the nation."' 7 Original intefition and original meaning were held to be the primary means by which the written
constitution could be kept a limited constitution. In this belief men as
politically opposed as Thomas Jefferson and John Marshall could stand
united. A written constitution, Jefferson said, was our "peculiar security"; 8 to Marshall, it was the "greatest of all improvements on political
institutions." 9
Professor Miller's argument, then, rests on a cracked foundation;
for he makes a common error when he seizes John Marshall's dictum
4. 2 THE
2d ed. 1937).
5.

RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787 at 73 (M. Farrand

Id. at v. 1, 422.

6. THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 361 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1911); No. 78, at
525 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1911).
7. TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 1 (G. McDowell ed. 1981) (quoting
James Madison to Henry Lee).
8. Thomas Jefferson to Wilson C. Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), quoted in THE LIFE
AND WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 573 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds. 1944).
9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
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in McCulloch v. Maryland0 (a statement Professor Miller holds to be
"the most important ever uttered on the theory of constitutional interpretation") 11 as his authority for a living constitution. Marshall's wellknown remark that the Constitution was "intended to endure for ages
to come and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs"1 2 is taken by Professor Miller to mean that the Constitution "may validly be considered to be a tacit delegation of power by
the framers to enable succeeding generations of Americans to write
their own fundamental law - to meet, that is, the exigencies of their
not the framers' times."13 The crucial element of Professor Miller's
argument derives from the mistaken notion that Marshall was referring
to constitutional interpretation by the judiciary. He was not. The power
of adaptation Marshall was pointing to was a legislative not a judicial
power. The flexibility to meet the unforeseen exigencies of the future
lay in the legislative power to draft whatever laws Congress should
deem necessary and proper. Marshall was speaking to the necessary
flexibility of statutory law, not fundamental law. Doubters need only
look as far as his opinion in Marbury v. Madison:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future
government, such principles, as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole
American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original
right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are
deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from which they proceed, is supreme,
and can seldom act, they are designed to be
1
permanent. '
Professor Miller assumes that the changes brought about in the
instruments of war "by the scientific-technological revolution"15 have
resulted in a substantive transformation in the nature of war as it is
understood under the Constitution. This does not necessarily follow.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Miller, supra note 2, at 28.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415 (emphasis original).
Miller, supra note 2, at 28.
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
Miller, supra note 2, at 28.
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Constitutionally,war is war. Constitutionally, Congress is obligated to
do what it considers to be necessary and proper to give contemporary
expression to its constitutional power to prepare for and wage war.
(The constitutional power to declare war implies a constitutional power
to prepare for war, following Marshall's logic in McCulloch.) If that
means, in the deliberate judgment of Congress, procuring and stockpiling nuclear armaments, then such an activity is constitutionally permissible. It may be imprudent and dangerous but it is not unconstitutional. Further, constitutionally, the President as Commander-in-Chief,
is empowered to direct whatever forces of war Congress places at his
disposal.
Professor Miller's argument grows from a belief that the judiciary,
in Owen Fiss's words, possesses "a special kind of substantive rationality"'16 that enables it to declare constitutional values and to make the
policy conform. Judges are not so much arbiters of concrete legal and
constitutional disputes as they are seers and soothsayers pondering
principles of abstract justice. Professor Miller apparently subscribes to
the dominant jurisprudential view that constitutional values - that is,
"broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity,
and decency" 117 - are the stuff of constitutional law. The Constitution
itself cannot be allowed to get in the way of doing good.
The constitutional and political dilemmas posed by this view are
that the declaration of a constitutional or public value is a highly intuitive and personal judicial matter. A constitutional value depends more
upon a creative judicial imagination than upon constitutional text or
intention. This is hardly the foundation of limited constitutional
government.
Conclusion
Professor Miller, like a growing number of Americans, is rightly
concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to borrow
Jonathan Schell's phrase, the fate of the earth.1 8 But his solutidn misses
the mark. Nuclear arms and the possibility of nucler war are too im16.
17.
18.

Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 (1979).
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).
J. SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH (1982).
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portant to delegate to the juriciary. Like all the important and controversial public debates that generally characterize a popular form of
government, they deserve to be addressed by political deliberation
not by judicial decree.
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